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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, 
a joint venture, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
WESLEY SINE, dba COTTONWOOD 
BOWLING LANES, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
COTTONWOOD BOWLING LANES, INC. 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 19861 
19839 
BACKGROUND FACTS PERTINENT TO THIS PETITION 
1. Wesley F. Sine entered into a written agreement to 
purchase the common stock of Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc. 
after his real estate agents had inquired of Sidney M. 
Horman, the lessor of the property, whether Sidney M. Horman 
would be willing to renew the lease which by its terms had an 
expiration date of September 14, 1981. (Findings of Fact 
Para. No. 8, R 1199) 
2. Sidney M. Horman, on at least two occasions advised 
Wesley F. Sine's real estate agents that he would be willing 
to renew the lease on reasonable terms but would not sign a 
new lease agreement until near or at the expiration of the 
lease which was currently in effect. (Findings of Fact Para. 
No. 9, R 1199) 
3. After the acquisition of the common stock of 
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., Wesley F. Sine requested that 
his real estate agents inquire of S.M. Horman concerning his 
intent regarding the renewal or the granting of the new lease 
at the expiration of the current lease. (Findings of Fact 
Para. No. 14, R 1200) 
4. S. M. Horman again assured the real estate agents 
of Wesley F. Sine that S. M. Horman would renew the lease 
agreement upon reasonable terms and conditions at the 
expiration of the then current lease. (Findings of Fact Para 
No. 15, R 1201) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. 1. The case at hand is distinguishable from 
the cases relied upon in the Decision rendered. In the case 
at hand the parties agreed to renew the lease agreement upon 
"reasonable terms", whereas the case law relied upon in the 
decision concerned agreements to renew by further 
"negotiation". 
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POINT NO, 2. The Court, in the Decision rendered, 
failed ta recognize that the issue presented was whether a 
definite agreement to renew upon "reasonable terms" was 
enforceable, as opposed to the question of whether an 
agreement to negotiate was enforceable• 
POINT NO. 3, The Decision rendered regarding the 
enforceability of the agreement to renew the lease 
effectively overruled a long standing body of Utah case law 
which is directly on point. In doing so, the Court relied 
upon case law which was not on point. 
POINT NO. 4. The Decision rendered regarding 
attorney's fees appears to have ignore^ and effectively 
overruled a long standing body of case law which is so 
closely related as to constitute persuasive authority, if not 
precedent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT HAS RELIED UPON CASE LAW WHICH IS 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE FACTS OF THE 
CASE AT HAND. 
The opinion rendered in the case at hand places great 
reliance upon Valcarce v. Bitters. 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d 
427 (1961). Valcarce is a case involving the validity of a 
promissory note, not the enforcement of an option to renew a 
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lease. In Valcarce the trial Court observed: 
"I find that there was some talk 
about a side contract * * * but I can't 
find out what the terms were * * * I 
just can't take the thread provided here 
and weave a contract for the parties." 
fid, at 428.) 
Upon reviewing the observation of the trial court, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
" . . . Under the circumstances shown to exist 
here, where there was simply some nebulous notion 
in the air that a contract might be entered into in 
the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of 
a contract the parties ought to have made and 
enforce it. . .[citation omitted]" 
fid, at 428-429.) 
In Valcarce the trial court found that there was an 
insufficient amount of evidence to determine what the 
agreement was between the parties. In the case at hand, the 
trial court was not only able to determine what the agreement 
was between the parties, but also made several specific 
Findings Of Fact about that agreement. The question is not 
what the parties agreed upon, but instead whether their 
agreement is enforceable. 
In Pinaree v. The Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 
P. 2d 1317 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the 
common law rule concerning options to renew agreements. In 
its opinion it cited Slayter v. Pasley, 199 Or. 616, 264 P. 
4 
2d 444 (1953) and quoted from Slayter, as follows: 
f,f,The majority rule, in essence, is 
that a provision for the extension or 
renewal of a lease must specify the time 
the lease is to extend and the rate of 
rent to be paid with such a degree of 
certainty and definiteness that nothing 
is left to future determination. If it 
falls short of this requirement, it is 
not enforceable . . . " 
The Court then explained the minority rule has 
two divisions. In the first, the provision is held 
enforceable if it clearly establishes a mode for 
ascertaining the future rental rate, as by 
arbitration, or in the second if there is an 
express declaration for a reasonable rental during 
the extension period, or other words or phrases 
which clearly connote and are legally synonymous 
with reasonable rental. Under the second division 
of the minority rule, the Court implies a mutual 
agreement for a reasonable rental." 
fid, at 1321) 
Pinaree, quoting from Slayter. accurately restated the 
common law regarding options to renew leases. Pinaree did 
not delineate which rule Utah would follow. 
Pinaree relied upon Slayter which in turn relied upon 
and quoted from Holtz v. Olds, 84 Ore. 567, 164 P. 583, which 
correctly recognized the common law which upheld preliminary 
agreements provided they established some means to arrive at 
the final agreement. In Holtz. the Court said: 
11
. . . [F]or in the lease there construed 
we find lfa canon by which the subsequent 
negotiations may be controlled." There the canon, 
criterion or test for the future rental rate was 
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established as "a reasonable rental under the then 
existing conditions." 
fid, at 449.) 
Pinaree must therefore be recognized as standing for the 
proposition that the common law upheld preliminary agreements 
which contained canons by which future agreements would be 
controlled, i. e. "reasonable". Pinaree must be recognized 
as standing for the proposition that under either the 
majority rule or the first minority rule, agreements to renew 
a lease upon "reasonable terms" were enforceable in most 
instances. 
Barker v. Francis. 741 P. 2d 548, 551 (Utah 1987), 
appears to make substantial inroads into Valcarce. In Baker, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that it was not necessary that 
the preliminary agreement contain all the particulars of the 
agreement. 
In Kier v. Condrack, 478 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court indicated that the rule requiring definiteness 
of terms: 
". . . is only applicable in the proper 
circumstances, where the justice of the case 
requires: as a shield to protect a party from an 
injustice, and not as a weapon with which to 
perpetrate an injustice. . ." 
fid, at 330.) 
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POINT NO. 2 
THE COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE 
THE ISSUE PRESENTED. 
It needs to be clearly understood that in Pinqree, the 
option agreement of the parties was to 
"renew the lease . . . upon the same terms and 
conditions of the original lease, except 
that the rental amount will be 
renegotiated . . . 
Factors of tax increase, costs of 
business increases or decreases, business 
volume and success, insurance costs and 
other reasonable allowances, will be the 
basis for terms of negotiation, 
(emphasis added) 
fid, at 1320.) 
The opinion rendered in the case at hand, fails to 
recognize that there is a clear distinction demonstrated in 
the case law between an agreement to renew a lease upon 
reasonable terms, and an agreement to negotiate the amount of 
rental. 
In the former case there is a standard by which the 
terms may be determined objectively, in the latter, the 
parties have merely made an agreement to agree with 
unspecified terms. 
The trial court found, as a matter of fact, that S. M. 
Horman had agreed to renew the lease agreement upon 
7 
"reasonable terms". (Findings of Fact Para No. 15, R 1201). 
At the time that S. M. Horman made his committment and 
agreement to renew upon "reasonable terms" he did not state 
that "many factors would have to be weighed and put into the 
equation". Such comments were made months later, during the 
trial, and related to the basis upon which he, in his mind 
would determine what was "reasonable". 
The "Findings" of the trier of fact should not be 
overturned on appeal where they are based upon substantial 
evidence. See Valcarce v. Bittersf 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P. 2d 
427. S. M. Horman1s later comments about the basis for the 
renewal were properly not included in the Findings because 
they were not communicated to Sine's agents when the promise 
to renew the lease was made. 
It is clear that Pinaree is distinguishable from the 
case at hand for the reasons indicated. Pinaree represented 
an agreement to "negotiate", while to the contrary, the case 
at hand represents an agreement to renew upon "reasonable 
terms". 
The decision rendered by the Court is therefore in error 
for its failure to recognize the distinction between the two 
factual circumstances. 
It also needs to be noted that the Utah Supreme Court 
8 
has recognized the right to have the future rental determined 
by "negotiation" where it is done through a method of 
appointing appraisers and/or by arbitration as specified in 
the lease agreement• 
POINT NO. 3 
THE DECISION RENDERED OVERRULES 
LONG STANDING CASE LAW. 
Cumminas v. Rvttina, 116 Utah 1, 207 P. 2d 804, 805 
(1949), indicated that a lease which contained a clause "with 
a five year option", was sufficiently definite to renew the 
lease upon the same terms and conditions. 
Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376 P. 2d 548 
(1962), involved an option to renew a lease agreement for a 
"further period". The trial court permitted extrinsic 
evidence to determine the meaning of the phrase and the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision. 
In Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P. 2d 686 
(1968), the Utah Supreme court stated: 
"Where, as here, a lease contains a clause 
granting the lessee the option to require of the 
lessor an extension of the lease period, but 
subject to arbitration so far as the rent is 
concerned, and where the lessee gives notice of 
intention to exercise the right of extension, this 
is binding on the lessor insofar as the term of the 
lease is concerned. . . . [T]he mere acceptance of 
a monthly rental at the old rate would not in and 
of itself necessarily constitute a waiver of his 
right to negotiate a new rate of rental as the 
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lease provides..." 
fid, at 689.) 
In Thomas J. Peck & Sons. Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, 
Inc. . 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P. 2d 446 (1973), the trial court 
held the lease agreement to be invalid, concluded that the 
tenant was a tenant under the common law, determined what the 
relationship was between the parties and the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed stating: 
w
. . .In the absence of an express agreement 
between them, the law necessarily implies that they 
will meet their obligations to each other on terms 
that are reasonable and fair to both. . . " 
fid, at 449.) 
In Hoffman v. Sullivan. 599 P. 2d 505 (Utah 1979) , the 
Utah Supreme Court reviewed a case involving an option. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"The trial court's finding that there was 
ambiguity in the option provision because there was 
"no provision . . . made as to how and when 
payments would be made" is unsupportable. The 
option price was fixed, and as to that there was no 
dispute. In general, such a provision calls for a 
payment of cash at the time of the exercise of the 
option; hence, as a matter of law, there was no 
ambiguity as to how and when payments would be 
made. 
Just recently this court sustained a contract 
which was more ambiguous than the pertinent 
provision in the instant contract. In Ferris v. 
Jennings, Utah, 595 P. 2d 857 (1979) this Court 
affirmed the enforceability of a contract in which 
the only term fixed was the purchase price. A 
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commision to be paid one of the parties, which was 
entirely indefinite and ambiguous, was held to be 
no obstacle to enforcement of the contract. In 
language directly pertinent to this case, this 
Court there stated: 
. . . where there is an agreement to sell 
property for a specified amount, the 
failure to designate the time of payment 
does not make the contract a nullity. 
Courts universally read into such 
contracts an obligation of payment within 
a time "reasonable" in the context of the 
transaction and circumstances of the 
parties. What is reasonable is a 
question of fact. 
See also Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 
339 P. 2d 101 (1959) ; Pepper v. Tanner. Inc. v. 
Kedo. Inc.. 13 Wash.App. 433, 535 P. 2d 857 
(1975)." 
fid, at 508.) 
In Valley Lane Corp. v. Bowen. 592 P. 2d 589 (Utah 
1979), the Utah Supreme Court, by implication, recognized the 
enforceability of an option to renew a lease agreement where 
the rental to be paid will have to be determined in the 
future by a method involving independent appraisers. 
In Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P. 2d 857 (Utah 1979) , the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized the general rule that 
"a contract will not be specifically enforced 
unless the obligations of the parties are "set 
forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be 
performed." 
fid, at 859) But, the Court went on to state: 
" . . . But to be considered therewith is the 
11 
further proposition that the parties to a contract 
are obliged to proceed in good faith to cooperate 
in performing the contract in accordance with its 
expressed intent. A contract is not fatally 
defective as to price if there is an agreement as 
to some formula or method for fixing it. . ." 
(emphasis added) 
fid, at 859). The Court quoted from another case and said: 
"In Burger v. City of Springfield, plaintiff 
sued on a contract by which he was engaged to 
negotiate the City's purchase of a water works for 
a "reasonable compensation for services to be fixed 
by the Council upon the completion of his 
services." A Missouri statute forbade the city to 
make any contract except for a consideration stated 
in writing. The court held the standard of 
"reasonableness" was definite enough to permit 
contract enforcement. 
In that opinion, the Missouri court pointed 
out that the law routinely enforces contracts which 
expressly or impliedly provide for a reasonable 
value to be placed on services. Where a trustee's 
fee is not fixed by statute or the trust 
instrument, the courts do not hesitate to fix a 
reasonable compensation, and they violate no 
precept against "making contracts" for parties in 
so acting. Courts frequently fix reasonable 
attorney's fees where contracts or negotiable 
instruments provide for them. 
In Rankin v. Compton, the issue was whether a 
contract was fatally indefinite because it provided 
that a "reasonable charge" should be assessed for 
certain financing services. The court held the 
parties to have fixed a sufficient standard so that 
the court could, without fabricating a contract, 
ascertain the price." 
fid, at 859-860) 
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POINT NO. 4 
THE DECISION RENDERED WILL HAVE 
AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON NUMEROUS 
LEASE AGREEMENTS IN UTAH. 
There are numerous lease agreements in existence in Utah 
which have options to renew and which require the rental rate 
during the new term to be increased to "reasonable rental", 
"fair market rental value", or some other such similar term. 
Those leases were executed by parties in reliance upon the 
belief that such a provision (option to renew) was valid and 
enforceable. The opinion rendered in this case makes all 
such clauses unenforceable. 
POINT NO. 5 
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE 
COURT OVERRULES PREVIOUS CASE 
LAW REGARDING ITS AWARD OF 
A T T O R N E Y ' S FEES TO THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
In the Findings of Fact, Paragraph 54, R 1212, the trial 
court specifically found as follows: 
"The Plaintiff, having terminated the lease, 
is not entitled to any attorney's fees under or by 
virtue of the lease agreement." 
This finding of the trial court, was rendered after it 
reviewed the written communications between the parties, and 
after it received testimony which demonstrated that the 
Cottonwood Mall did not want the bowling lanes because it did 
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not create the right type of tenant mix. 
In Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P. 2d 1102 
(Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court established the rule that 
when a party elects to terminate a lease agreement and 
proceed under the unlawful detainer statute it may not also 
claim the right to attorneys fees under the terminated 
contract. The Utah Supreme Court said: 
"Concerning the award of attorneyfs fees, the 
situation is different. There are two difficulties 
with that award. The first is that the allegations 
of the plaintiff fs complaint and the relief 
demanded clearly indicate that the plaintiff had 
cancelled and terminated the contract and based its 
cause of action on our unlawful detainer statutes 
Chapter 36, Title 78, U.C.A. 1953. Therefore it 
was not then entitled to invoke the covenants of 
the contract to obtain an attorney's fee. . ." 
fid, at 1105.) 
In Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P. 2d 294, 
(1954), the Utah Supreme Court held that attorney's fees 
would not be awarded to a party foreclosing (under the theory 
of forfeiture), a vendee's rights under a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, for the reason that the action became one in 
unlawful detainer and not to enforce the provisions of the 
contract. 
It is difficult to see any theoretical difference 
between the case at hand and Jacobson. 
The holding in the case at hand appears to overrule not 
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only Lincoln, but also Jacboson and the entire body of case 
law concerning the right to attorney's fees under Uniform 
Real Estate Contract forclosures. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant seeks to have the Utah Supreme Court grant 
Appellant's petition for rehearing to reconsider its decision 
which concludes: 
1. That S. M. Horman's promise stated and restated to 
"renew the lease upon reasonable terms" was not enforceable 
in Utah; and, 
2. That the trial court's determination that no 
attorney's fees be awarded was in error. 
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, counsel for Appellant hereby certifies that this 
Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for 
delay. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
Dated this day of December, 1988. 
Jack L. Schoenhals 
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